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BEYOND THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE:
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR WORKPLACE
VIOLENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Without question, the increase in workplace violence has reached epi-
demic proportions in recent years. Alarmingly, one out of every six vio-
lent crimes occurs in the workplace,1 and homicide is the second leading
cause of workplace death in the United States.2 Everyday, criminal at-
tacks are responsible for the death of three people in the workplace and
serious injury to sixty-one others The nationwide increase in workplace
violence has placed an enormous strain on human resource managers.4 In
fact, employers are increasingly subject to substantial liability for hiring
and retaining dangerous employees. In an effort to guard against such li-
ability, employers must often probe into the backgrounds, qualifications,
and mental stability of current and potential employees to evaluate their
suitability for employment .
1. See Ann E. Phillips, Comment, Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Em-
ployer's Role, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 139, 140 n.5 (1996) (citing Justice Report On Workplace
Violence Confirms Trend Already Noted By SHRM, PR NEWSWiRE, July 22, 1994, at
0722DC030).
2. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 140.
3. See id
4. In its 1996 Workplace Violence Survey, the Society for Human Resource Manage-
ment ("SHRM"), reports that nearly half of 1,016 human resource professionals polled said
that they were aware of at least one violent incident or threatened violent incident that oc-
curred in their organizations since January 1, 1994. See Workplace Violence: Workplace
Violence Threats Common, SHRM Survey Finds, Empl. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at D-5
(June 26, 1996). Verbal threats remain the most common form of violence on the job. See
itd According to the survey, violent action and threats occurred most often between co-
employees, whereas situations in which employees acted against their supervisors account for
only 17% of the incidents. See id The 1996 Workplace Violence Survey report can be ob-
tained by writing to SHRM, 606 North Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314-1997 or by
calling (703) 548-3440.
5. See Katrin U. Byford, Comment, The Quest for the Honest Worker? A Proposal for
Regulation of Integrity Testing, 49 SMU L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1996). Employers have inte-
grated a number of preventive strategies to confront workplace violence, including: (1) the
development of policies and procedures for dealing with threatening conduct, (2) the institu-
tion of training programs for managers and supervisors to help them recognize employee
violence, and (3) the initiation of threat assessment teams. See Janet E. Goldberg, Employ-
ees with Mental and Emotional Problems-Workplace Security and Implications of State Dis-
crimination Laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, Workers' Corn-
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The unpredictable nature of workplace violence creates a complex se-
ries of legal tensions for employers who attempt to remedy violent inci-
dents in their organization. These tensions stem from the legal protec-
tions afforded individuals under current anti-discrimination and privacy
laws and an employer's obligation to maintain a safe working environ-
ment.6 Simply put, employers must walk a fine line when they are con-
fronted with threatening employees. After all, the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act ("ADA") protects qualified employees and applicants who
have serious mental or psychological disorders, which are often attribut-
able to the threat of workplace violence.7 In addition, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964-as well as laws addressing interference with
contractual relations, defamation, and invasion of privacy-also play an
important role in assuring that the individual rights of employees are held
inviolate.9
This Comment examines the tenets of employer liability for work-
place violence, including a discussion of the exclusivity rule under work-
ers' compensation law, common law theories of liability, and current ad-
ministrative responses. As this discussion will demonstrate, the current
archetype of legal standards used to address the workplace violence co-
nundrum, including the recently promulgated OSHA guidelines, are
grossly inadequate. As a result, this Comment discusses the need for
greater comprehensive legislation in this area, focusing on uniform rules
that must be promulgated at the federal level. Finally, the benefits of
such a comprehensive legislative scheme are briefly discussed.
II. THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE
In the early twentieth century, the prevailing tort system made it diffi-
cult for injured employees to recover against employers.0 In addressing
this imbalance, the courts established workers' compensation laws to ef-
fectively remove civil suits brought by injured employees from the tort
pensation, and Related Issues, 24 STETSON L. REV. 201,234 (1994).
6. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 201.
7. See Richard T. Sampson & Johnathan R. Topazian, Violence in the Workplace, FOR
THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1996, at 20, 22.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
9. It should be noted that this Comment does not address the elements necessary to es-
tablish a "hostile work environment" for the purpose of sexual harassment claims. For a
thorough discussion of this issue, see Kerry A. Colson, Comment, Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.: The Supreme Court Moves One Step Closer to Establishing a Workable Definition for
Hostile Work Environment, Sexual Harassment Claims, 30 NEw ENO. L. REV. 441 (1996).
10. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 150.
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system." By the nature of its operation, the workers' compensation
scheme relinquishes the employees' common law rights in exchange for
timely, scheduled payments for work related injuries in accordance with
the applicable compensation statutes. 2 It is widely understood that state
workers' compensation statutes provide the exclusive relief granted for
injuries arising out of an individual's employment.13 Therefore, a claimant
who sustains injuries during the course of the employment relationship is
likely barred from suing the employer in tort, even under a theory of neg-
ligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision.14
A long line of case law exemplifies the difficulty injured employees
have experienced in bringing actions against employers outside of the
workers' compensation scheme. In Ward v. Bechtel Corp.,5 for example,
a female engineer brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, premises liability, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention-all violations of Texas state law.16 Ward's claims
stemmed from her relationship with a subordinate employee who verbally
and physically threatened her on a routine basis." Ward alleged that this
behavior frightened her and forced her to resign from her position with
Bechtel. 8 As a result, Bechtel hired two experts in workplace violence to
evaluate the situation. 9 After a brief threat assessment, the experts de-
termined that the subordinate employee did not pose a threat and ac-
cepted Ward's resignation. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the exclusive remedy of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act barred each of Ward's claims for premises
liability, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention
because each of these claims were based on injuries sustained during the
course and within the scope of Ward's employment.1 In accordance with
11. See id.
12. See icL
13. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 233.
14. See id, at 233 n.229. By the same token, a business patron injured during a store
robbery is afforded a tort claim against the business, while an employee injured in the same
robbery is limited to workers' compensation coverage. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 152.
15. No. CIV.A.H.94-2813, 1996 WL 763303, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 1996), affd, 102
F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997).
16. lId at *1.
17. Id- at *2-5.
18. I1& at *2.
19. Id.
20. Ward v. Bechtel Corp., No. CIV.A.H.94-2813, 1996 WL 763303, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
May 1, 1996), affd 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997).
21. See id. at *7.
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the decision in Ward, other courts have often treated the "scope of em-
ployment" very broadly when faced with claims brought by injured em-
ployees. For example, in Maxwell v. Hospital Authority, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that a hospital patient representative was injured
within the "scope of her employment" when she was robbed, raped, and
beaten in an employee parking lot after her shift had ended.2 As a result,
the court deemed worker's compensation to be the exclusive remedy for
the employee's recovery.2
Despite the limitations placed on workers' compensation claims, sev-
eral courts have carved out exceptions to the exclusivity requirement by
incorporating a dual capacity doctrine and intentional tort exceptions into
the analysis of worker's compensation claims.2 Under an intentional tort
theory, the character of the injury falls outside the scope of compensation
statutes since the injury did not arise "by accident" during the employ-
ment relationship.26 In order to prevail under this exception, however, an
employer's act must be genuinely intentional, or the employer must have
acted deliberately with the specific intention of injuring the employee.' It
is worth noting that an employer's knowledge of a condition that poses a
threat of harm to an employee may be viewed as deliberate or intentional
when the employer permits the condition to continue.2
Suits that are brought under the intentional injury exception fre-
quently come out on either side of the liability spectrum. For example, a
cause of action against an employer may exist based on allegations that a
fellow employee physically harassed another employee provided that the
employer allegedly ratified this behavior.29 On the other hand, an action
22. 413 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
23. Id. at 205-06 (quotations added).
24. Id. at 207. See also Bickham v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 488 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (La.
Ct. App. 1986) (library clerk who was sexually assaulted by unknown assailant in empty
classroom, incurred injuries during course and scope of employment; therefore, state work-
ers' compensation act was the exclusive remedy).
25. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 151.
26. See David C. Minneman, Annotation, Workers' Compensation Law as Precluding
Employee's Suit Against Employer for Third Person's Criminal Attack, 49 A.L.R. 4th 926,
932 (1986) (quotations omitted).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Hart v. Nat'l Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70-71 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (concluding that facts revealed that the employer was aware of the fellow employee's
acts and did nothing to discipline him); see also Kennedy v. Parrino, 555 So. 2d 990, 993 (La.
Ct. App. 1989) (employee's complaint stated a viable cause of action since the alleged facts
demonstrated that the employer intended for the plaintiff to experience harmful, or at least
slightly painful, conduct).
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brought against an employer for serious injuries sustained after a foreman
struck a subordinate in the face may not fall within the intentional tort
exception if the employee fails to demonstrate that the employer in-
tended or directed the battery?
The unpredictable nature of these suits induces many employers to,
settle workplace violence claims to avoid the potential of sympathetic ju-
ries and unfavorable outcomes.3' Moreover, employers who do not sub-
scribe to a workers' compensation insurance plan are faced with limited
defenses in confronting the claims of workers injured by violence in the
workplace.2 Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and employee
negligence are not affirmative defenses under the current workplace vio-
lence regime.33 Furthermore, an employer may be held liable for negli-
gent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision even if the al-
leged conduct of an employee falls outside the scope of the employment
relationship. 4 To make matters worse, a third party plaintiff who sues an
employer for injuries related to workplace violence need not fulfill the
scope of employment requirement under these theories of recovery."
The diversity of compensation schemes throughout the states has left em-
ployers without uniform standards for applying the exclusivity rule to
claims of workplace violence. Furthermore, it is evident that the failure
to prevent workplace violence in the face of known or suspected dangers
30. See Gordon v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
see also Prescott v. CSPH, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App. 1994) (intentional injury ex-
ception held inapplicable to co-worker's attack on employee outside of work since there was
no showing that the employer hired the co-worker for the specific purpose of assaulting the
employee).
31. Claims brought against employers for workplace violence "have resulted in millions
of dollars in settlements and judgments, bad publicity, and increased insurance premiums for
employers." See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 22 (quoting Robert L. Levin, Work-
place Violence: Navigating through the Minefield of Legal Liability, 11 LAB. LAw. 171, 175
(1995)).
32. See Terry S. Boone, Violence in the Workplace and the New Right to Carry Gun
Law-What Employers Need to Know, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 873, 877 (1996).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 879; see also J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273,305 (1995). In some instances, employers may be unable to
collect under their general liability insurance policy if the terms of the agreement contain an
assault and battery exclusion. See, e.g., Century Transit Sys., Inc. v. American Empire Sur-
plus Lines Ins. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]e conclude that
American had no duty to indemnify or defend Century because the claim asserted by the
plaintiffs was based on an assault and battery and a clear and unambiguous exclusion pre-
cluded coverage as a matter of law."); Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905
F. Supp. 1139 (D. R.I. 1995)(holding that the insurance company was not obligated to defend
the corporation).
35. See Boone, supra note 32, at 879.
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may be regarded as "intentional" conduct. Thus, plaintiffs will be allowed
to file negligence claims under the intentional tort exception. 6 Once the
intentional tort exception is invoked, an injured employee is able to pro-
ceed under a variety of common law theories. The following section dis-
cusses the structure of these common law theories and the difficulty em-
ployers must face in defending these claims.
III. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY,
Many common law claims of employer liability stem from the concept
of a master's breach of a duty owed to an injured servant." One commen-
tator has categorized an employer's liability to an injured employee into
three distinct theories:
First, an employer may be directly liable to an injured employee
because the employer acted wrongfully toward her. For exam-
ple, the employer may have acted negligently by breaching its
duty to protect her from harm, its duty to hire competent super-
visors, its duty to train employees in matters of safety, or its duty
to investigate and remedy dangerous conditions. Second, the
employer may have adopted or ratified a wrongful act of another
employee, thus assuming responsibility for the harm caused.
Third, even when an employer has acted properly toward an
employee, that employer's obligation to protect its employees is
... non-delegable. Thus, even when the employer is not at fault,
vicarious liability may result when one employee is harmed by
another.39
In order to establish employer liability under a negligence theory, the
plaintiff must establish all of the elements of common law negligence-
duty, breach, cause, and harm. The existence of a legal duty of care is
36. See generally Minneman, supra note 26, at 932; Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7,
at 22 ("[T]he claim may survive where the employer's conduct rises to the level of an inten-
tional tort, where a supervisor is the perpetrator, or where the employer knowingly permits
dangerous working conditions.")(citing Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
37. This Comment does not address the tenets of premises liability as it pertains to in-
vitees and licensees, etc. Although this theory is alleged in some workplace violence cases,
Part IV, which discusses OHSA requirements, provides a more substantive review of the
employer's responsibility with respect to the workplace environment. Furthermore, this
Comment does not examine the master-servant relationship which is a common issue in
workplace violence claims.
38. See David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating The Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66,
79 (1995).
39. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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usually a question of law for a judge, while foreseeability is often a ques-
tion of fact for the jury." In the duty context, foreseeability is "limited to
an evaluation of 'whether the category of negligent conduct ... is suffi-
ciently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced [so] that liability
may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.' 4. In evaluating
the evidence of foreseeability, many courts use a "prior similar incidents"
rule or a "totality of the circumstances" test.42 The prior similar incidents
evaluation considers a number of factors, including the proximity, time,
number, and types of prior violent incidents in determining whether the
particular harm was foreseeable.43 The totality of the circumstances test,
on the other hand, examines not only past criminal acts, but the nature of
the business, the condition of the premises, and the surrounding neigh-
borhood. 4
These distinct theories of liability under the master-servant relation-
ship often give rise to claims for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
assumption of a legal duty to protect. Under each of these theories, an
employer is liable for intentionally tortious acts when its employees
commit such acts outside the scope of their employment.45 Accordingly,
each theory requires that the employer, "through its managerial em-
ployee[s], have failed to take due care to prevent [the] tortious conduct."'
Two common fact scenarios surround allegations of managerial negli-
gence: (1) the plaintiffs allege that the employer should have screened
applicants more scrupulously and (2) plaintiffs attempt to advance some
proof that the employer failed to respond to actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the facts.47 As mentioned earlier, cases involving negligent hiring,
supervision, or retention are those that have failed the scope of employ-
ment test." The next section examines each of these legal concepts by
providing the current status of the law in these areas, a brief discussion of
the case law, and the problems that surround each theory.
A. Negligent Hiring
A cause of action for negligent hiring occurs when an employer fails
40. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 169.
41. See iL
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Verkerke, supra note 34, at 305.
46. Id. at 306.
47. See id.
48. Id
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to exercise ordinary care in its hiring practices.4 An employer "hires
negligently when he employs a person with known propensities, or pro-
pensities which could have been discovered [through a] reasonable inves-
tigation. ' If an employer hires or retains an employee with knowledge
of these propensities, the employer may be held liable for subsequent
personal injury or death caused by the foreseeable acts of this employee."
The plaintiff must establish the following six elements in order to prevail
under a negligent hiring theory: (1) that an employment relationship ex-
ists; (2) that the employee is incompetent; (3) that the employer had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the incompetence; (4) that the em-
ployer's act or omission caused plaintiffs injuries; (5) that the negligent
hiring was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (6) that the
actual damage or harm resulted from the tortious act. 2 An examination
of the case law reveals that most negligent hiring claims turn on the issues
of duty and foreseeability.5s If an employer fails to conduct a reasonable
background search of an employee, it has breached its duty of care."
Foreseeability is established when a plaintiff demonstrates that there was
a foreseeable risk that some injury might occur.5 According to one com-
mentator, the courts have been inclined to take a rather sweeping view of
the range of foreseeable outcomes, "yet have provided few guidelines to
aid employers in defining the elements of employee 'fitness,' or in decid-
ing just how probing a 'reasonably sufficient' background investigation
should be. 56 The ambiguity of these guidelines is evident in the inconsis-
tent court opinions discussed below.
1. Inconsistencies Among the Federal and State Courts in Applying the
Elements of Negligent Hiring Claims
A cursory glance at federal case law reveals the courts' struggle to de-
49. See Boone, supra note 32, at 879.
50. See id. See also Goldberg, supra note 5, at 215 ("Under a negligent hiring cause of
action, an employer may be liable where a person is harmed by one of its employees, the em-
ployer 'knew or should have known through a reasonable investigation prior to hiring that
the employee was unfit, and the injury to the third party was proximately caused by the em-
ployee."').
51. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 22 (comparing J. v. Victory Tabernacle
Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988), and Peck v. Siau, 827 P.2d 1108 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992)).
52. See, e.g., Byford, supra note 5, at 359; Boone, supra note 32, at 880.
53. See Byford, supra note 5, at 359.
54. See id.
55. See id at 360..
56. Id.
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fine the attributes of a "reasonably sufficient" background investigation.
In Senger v. United States,r a tow truck driver brought an action against
the government pursuant to the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") after
he was assaulted by a Postal Service employee." Pursuant to his negligent
hiring claim, the plaintiff submitted as evidence briefs and affidavits of
the postal worker's history of violent behavior." Even though the Postal
Service was not aware of every violent incident listed in the plaintiff's
supporting affidavits, the Ninth Circuit held that the tow truck driver pre-
sented enough specific facts to create a genuine issue of fact concerning
the foreseeability of the assault.' ° As a result, the court held that the dis-
trict court had erred by granting suimmary judgment to the defendant
with respect to the negligent hiring claim.6 It is important to note that the
dissent in this case took serious issue with the majority's disposition of
this case because: (1) the record indicated that the Postal Service had "far
from complete knowledge" of the defendant's mental stability and violent
behavior; (2) all of the events specified in the affidavits occurred between
six and twenty years prior to the attack; (3) the Postal Service conducted
an investigation to see whether the postal worker had falsified his em-
ployment record; and (4) the constructive knowledge that could be im-
puted to the Postal Service was limited to incidents that occurred outside
of the work environment.62
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Senger, the District Court of Kansas in
Doe v. WTMJ, Inci was not convinced that an employer's lack of know-
ledge concerning the criminal convictions of one of its employees should
rise to the level of negligent hiring. 4 In Doe, a minor listener brought an
57. 103 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. Id. at 1438.
59. Id at 1440. The violent history of the postal worker included the following: (1) he
was tried and acquitted on murder charges; (2) he was committed to a psychiatric facility in
1976 after charges arising from an attack against his wife; (3) he was committed to other fa-
cilities for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from his service in the Viet-
nam War; (4) he was convicted in 1971 for drunk and disorderly conduct and in 1977, for
harassment; and (5) he was arrested in 1985 for assaulting his ex-girlfriend on the job. Id.
60. Id. at 1443.
61. Id. at 1444.
62. Id. at 1446.
63. 927 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Kan. 1996). It is also possible to find instances in which a
court will absolve an employer of liability for negligent hiring despite the employee's prior
criminal record. See Worstell Parking, Inc. v. Aisida, 442 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that, although a parking attendant checked "yes" in response to a question on
an employment application regarding convictions, the record lacks evidence suggesting that
the attendant had a propensity toward violence).
64. 927 F. Supp. at 1433.
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action against a radio station after a station announcer pled guilty to
charges of kidnapping and molestation. 5 From November 1993 until
February 1994, the radio announcer engaged in sexually explicit conversa-
tion with the plaintiff on the station's request line." On one occasion, the
announcer took the plaintiff, a minor female, to a motel in downtown
Kansas City to engage in acts of oral sex and sexual intercourse.67 Prior to
these incidents, the announcer's former supervisor told the station's pro-
gram director that he had been fired for insubordination.6 Although the
station questioned the announcer about the circumstances surrounding
his termination, they did not conduct a background search for any crimi-
nal or civil improprieties.69 Nevertheless, the district court concluded that
the defendant did not have reason to know "that [the announcer] had a
dangerous proclivity to kidnap and molest someone."70 Furthermore, the
court did not feel that a review of the announcer's civil and criminal rec-
ords would suggest that he possessed a dangerous "proclivity" such as the
one at issue.7' The court's position is wholly inconsistent with that of the
Ninth Circuit in Senger, since the station's knowledge of the employee's
record was not a significant factor in assessing the employer's liability.
Notwithstanding the different positions taken by the federal courts in
each of the above cases, inconsistent interpretations are even more re-
plete in the state court. Such inconsistency is evident in the Long v.
Brookside Mano?2 and Deerings West Nursing Center v. Scott73 decisions.
In Long, a negligent hiring action was brought against a nursing home
when an employee assaulted an elderly woman in her room.74 The plain-
tiff accidentally soiled herself when the defendant was attending to her.75
The defendant subsequently became enraged and began kicking and
punching the plaintiffs head and body. 76 As it turns out, the nursing
home neglected to check with employees' previous employers before
hiring them as nurses.7 In addition, the defendant employer failed to
65. Id at 1430.
66. Id. at 1432.
67. Id
68. Id. at 1431.
69. Doe v. WTMJ, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (D. Kan. 1996).
70. Id. at 1433.
71. Id. at 1434.
72. 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
73. 787 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App. 1990).
74. Long, 885 S.W.2d at 71.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Id. at 72.
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conduct a criminal history check on the nurses.78 Despite these short-
comings, the Tennessee Court of Appeals did not believe that an investi-
gation of these sources would have enabled the nursing home to predict
that the employee would abuse the plaintiff.79 As a result, the court held
that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the failure to take these
precautions was a proximate cause of her injuries.'
By contrast, the Texas Court. of Appeals in Deerings West affirmed
the lower court's determination that a defendant nursing home was both
negligent and grossly negligent in the hiring of an employee who as-
saulted an elderly visitor." The nursing home hired the employee nurse
after a phone interview, yet they neither required him to produce a Texas
license nor did they perform a background check of his record.' There-
fore, the nursing home was not aware the employee had previously com-
mitted over fifty-six thefts.' Based on these facts, the Texas Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant's ac-
tions amounted to gross negligence.'
The similar facts in each of the above cases, coupled with the drasti-
cally different dispositions are a prime example of the lack of uniformity
in state based negligent hiring claims. As each of these cases illustrate,
employers, in the absence of a coherent legal standard, face a great deal
of difficulty in assessing the sufficiency of their background procedures.
Moreover, an employer cannot undertake a probing search into a pro-
spective employee's background without remaining cognizant of the rules
and regulations governing such investigations. The next section discusses
how the current alternatives used to avoid liability under negligent hiring
claims are at arms with the individual protections rooted in current pri-
vacy and discrimination laws.
2. Difficulties for the Employer in Preventing Negligent Hiring
Decisions
Due to the dramatic increase in workplace violence, employers have
made several attempts to limit their liability under negligent hiring claims.
These attempts include questioning potential employees about their ar-
rest records or convictions, conducting background/reference checks, in-
78. Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70,72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 73.
80. Id. at 74.
81. See Deerings West Nursing Ctr. v. Scott, 787 S.W.2d 494,496-97 (Tex. App. 1990).
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id. at 497.
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quiring into a potential employee's mental or physical impairments, and
performing integrity screening tests.'
Most states govern an employer's use of conviction records in reach-
ing an employment decision by statute." However, these statutes often
exclude the use of arrest records in employment decisions since arrests
are not viewed as tantamount to an individual's guilty On the federal
level, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has
stated that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes an em-
ployer from asking a potential employee about arrest records." This pre-
sents a unique problem for employers who receive applications from po-
tential employees with numerous arrests. For example, in Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc.," an employer elected to withdraw an offer of em-
ployment when it discovered that the applicant had previously been ar-
rested fourteen times." As a matter of policy, the employer refused to
hire applicants who had been arrested more than once." The court held
that this employment policy was discriminatory and could not be justified
by any business necessity."2 Ironically, these prior arrests could be used as
evidence of foreseeability on the part of the employer in a subsequent
negligent hiring claim if the employee who had been previously arrested
were to engage in violent conduct. In other words, the employer could be
held accountable for a hiring decision it was compelled to make.
Unlike arrest records, an employer can consider an applicant's crimi-
nal convictions in making hiring decisions." As one commentator sug-
gests, however, not all criminal convictions can be used as an absolute bar
to employment.9 An employer must also consider the nature of the crime
committed, the length of time since the conviction, and the applicant's
work record since the conviction."5 Employers who use conviction rec-
85. Boone, supra note 32, at 884.
86. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 222.
87. See id.
88. See Boone, supra note 32, at 884. The rationale behind the EEOC's position stems
largely from the fact that certain minority groups are arrested at a disproportionately higher
rate than their non-minority counterparts. Id.
89. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), afftd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
90. Id at 402.
91. Id
92. Id. at 402-03.
93. See Boone, supra note 32, at 884.
94. See id. at 884-85 (citing the Fair Employment Practices Manual, EEOC Guide to
Pre-Employment Inquiries, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 695 at 443:67 (1995)).
95. Id. Despite these precautions, a jury might still find an employer liable. See Gold-
berg, supra note 5, at 225 n.179 (citing McKishnie v. Rainbow Int'l Carpet Dyeing & Clean-
ing Co., No. 91-3617-CA Div. (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 11, 1994) (jury awarded one million
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ords must also ensure that their policy is uniformly enforced.' Thus, an
employer could be obligated to hire an ex-convict, despite the ramifica-
tions of such a decision, if that individual is qualified for the position and
the employer cannot cite any other reason to exclude him or her other
than criminal convictions.
Another option an employer has in screening potential applicants is
the background or reference check. However, employers must take rea-
sonable precautions when conducting such an inquiry since the employee
enjoys a common law right to be free from unreasonable intrusions into
areas where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.' Moreover, the
information provided during a reference check often has limited value
since, to a large extent, only names, dates, and "serial numbers" are actu-
ally uncovered."
Finally, an employer may use some type of examination to investigate
whether a potential employee has a physical or mental impairment that
would demonstrate a proclivity towards violent behavior. However, most
state laws and regulations contain strict requirements with regard to
screening applicants." For example, the use of pre-employment medical
inquiries and examinations, polygraphs, and fingerprints are strictly pro-
hibited.' ° While an employer is permitted to ask questions pertaining to
the individual's ability to perform the job described in the employment
application,'0 ' the Americans with Disabilities Act"2 ("ADA") places se-
vere limitations on these inquiries as they relate to an individual's mental
problems or physical disabilities.'3 Under the ADA, "an employer can-
dollars to the parents of two students who were murdered by an employee who had an arrest
record but no prior convictions)).
96. See Byford, supra note 5, at 339.
97. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 225.
98. See Boone, supra note 32, at 885; see also Henry E. Farber & Carol Scott, Negotiat-
ing the Labor Law Mine Field. Selected Topics, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1051, 1058 (1995). The
"name, rank, and serial number" response often stems from the liability concerns of the
party who releases the information for use in defamation and privacy actions brought by
former employees.
99. For example, a Wisconsin statute provides that "no employer may ... [d]irectly or
indirectly require, request, suggest or cause an employee or prospective employee to take or
submit to a lie detector test." See Byford, supra note 5, at 336 n.45 (quoting Wis. Stat. §
111.37(2) (Supp. 1997-98)).
100. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 212; Farber & Scott, supra note 98, at 1058.
101. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 212. Once an offer is made, the employer may re-
quire the individual to undergo a broader medical examination provided that the examina-
tion is uniformly required for everyone, and that the ultimate hiring decision does not violate
the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Farber & Scott, supra note 98, at 1058.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (1994).
103. See Boone, supra note 32, at 885-86.
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not reject an otherwise qualified applicant on grounds of disability unless
the disability makes him a 'direct threat' to himself or others. 1.4
Alternatively, the use of an "integrity" or honesty test, is permissible
provided the test is relatively generic and is able to escape the limitations
discussed above. However, the use of honesty testing might constitute a
tortious invasion of privacy under the common law if the examination is
improperly administered. 5 Another fundamental difficulty with honesty
testing is the lack of consensus regarding the accuracy of these examina-
tions. 6 The self-reporting nature of these examinations makes them sus-
ceptible to "faking" or dishonest answers.'O' As one commentator ex-
plains, the use of integrity tests in the hiring context is grossly inadequate
as a shield against future liability: "Because honesty tests are not rou-
tinely designed to detect aggressiveness or violent tendencies, some sug-
gest that they bear little substantial relationship to the types of conduct at
issue in traditional negligent hiring claims and hence are of little benefit
as either an empirical precaution or a legal defense. ''l'0
For the aforementioned reasons, the process of screening for violent
employees is excessive from a legal standpoint since the limitations are
great, and the methods are arguably unreliable. Without any concrete
standard to follow, employers are left to decide what amount of probing
is necessary to conduct a "reasonably sufficient" background search with-
out infringing upon current privacy and discrimination laws. In the ab-
sence of legislative guidance, this "happy medium" is a legal fiction for
some employers.
Unfortunately for employers, concerns of workplace violence do not
end with the hiring decision. In fact, an employee, once hired, can expose
104. Id. at 886. The "threat" must be imminent, the risk must be severe, and health
care providers may not base the decision on speculative risk. See Farber & Scott, supra note
98, at 1059 (quotations added).
105. See Byford, supra note 5, at 339; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652A (1977). Employees have a legitimate interest in resisting an integrity test as an unnec-
essary intrusion into privacy or in questioning the validity of a test upon which their liveli-
hood depends; see Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Employee's Action in Tort Against
Party Administering Polygraph, Drug, or Similar Test at Request of Actual or Prospective
Employer, 89 A.L.R. 4th 527, 533 (1991). Depending upon the circumstances, a prospective
employee may have a cause of action against the party administering the examination in
conjunction with the employer. See generally Levine v. A. Madley Corp., 516 So. 2d 1101,
1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the general language of an exculpatory clause
did not release the employer, nor the polygraph examiner, from their negligence in adminis-
tering the polygraph examination).
106. See Byford, supra note 5, at 340-42.
107. Id. at 348.
108. i. at 361 (footnote omitted).
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his or her employer to substantial liability if that employee subsequently
engages in violent behavior. As discussed in the next section, this situa-
tion can give rise to claims of negligent retention and supervision. To
avoid liability under these claims, the employer must address the same
concerns of discrimination, defamation, and privacy.
B. Negligent Retention and Supervision
An employer who hires and retains an employee with knowledge of
the employee's criminal or arrest record may be held liable for the indi-
vidual's tortious conduct under a theory of negligent retention or supervi-
sion.' °' As in a negligent hiring action, the plaintiff's injury must be fore-
seeable before liability will attach." However, negligent retention differs
from negligent hiring in that the employer is unaware that the employee
is unfit for employment until after the individual is hired."' In the same
general context, negligent supervision allegations arise only when an em-
ployee injures another employee due to improper training or supervi-
sion."2 Under each theory, managers have a duty to take reasonable pre-
cautions in preventing subordinate employees from causing harm to a
third person."3 In order to avoid liability under these theories, the em-
ployer must immediately respond with appropriate precautions against
further harm once it becomes aware of an employee's violent tenden-
cies."4 As the cases discussed below illustrate, these precautionary meas-
ures place an enormous strain on management. This is especially true
when the knowledge of an employee's dangerous propensities are con-
structively charged to a company, even if subordinate employees are the
only individuals aware of a co-worker's criminal history."5
109. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Employer's Knowledge of Employee's Past
Criminal Record as Affecting Liability for Employee's Tortious Conduct, 48 A.L.R. 3d 359,
361 (1973).
110. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 216 ("It is not required that the particular injury ...
should have been foreseen, but rather that some sort of general harm to the plaintiff or
someone similarly situated should have been anticipated."). Foreseeability usually hinges
upon the facts of a specific case. See Id.
111. See id at 215.
112. See Boone, supra note 32, at 880.
113. See Verkerke, supra note 34, at 305.
114. See id. at 306.
115. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 218-19 (citing Bryant v. Livigni, 619 N.E.2d 550,
553-58 (Ii. App. Ct. 1993) (knowledge of a manager's prior battery could be imputed to the
store by virtue of his co-workers' knowledge)).
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1. Predicting the Unpredictable: Situations in Which an Employer May
Be Liable for an Employee's Violent Conduct
Despite strong public policy favoring the rehabilitation of ex-convicts,
an employer may face liability when it learns of an employee's criminal
record and fails to determine whether the individual poses a safety risk.
For example, in Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc.,"' a custodian was re-hired af-
ter he had been released from prison for strangling a co-worker."7 After
scratching a death threat on a locker belonging to a female co-worker
several days earlier, the custodian killed the woman in her driveway
nearly six hours after her shift had ended."' The court found sufficient
evidence to reverse summary judgment on the negligent retention claim
against the employer."' The court reasoned that given the combination of
the custodian's troubled work history and prior violent conduct, the vio-
lent attack against the deceased was foreseeable from the standpoint of
the employer.'# In Haddock v. New York,'2' a similar case, a city was held
liable for injuries sustained by a child who was raped in a park by a city
employee who had a lengthy criminal record.' According to the court,
the city failed to exercise due discretion after receiving actual knowledge
of the employee's criminal history.' The unfavorable outcome of these
cases creates a disincentive on the part of employers to hire rehabilitated
criminals because the employers have an interest in avoiding the risk of
foreseeable harm. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to obtain
knowledge of an employee's improprieties through the usual reference
channels. Moreover, an employee might neglect to inform an employer
of his or her criminal status during the course of a reasonable inquiry.
Even in instances where an employee is not entirely candid about the
nature of his or her criminal background, the employer may still be held
liable for failure to investigate the nature of the employee's criminal his-
tory. For example, a Massachusetts appellate court held that a jury could
reasonably determine that a bar patron's injury after a bartender alleg-
edly punched him in the face was foreseeable.2 4 The court based its de-
termination on the fact that the employer, after learning of the bar-
116. 496 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
117. Id. at 421.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 424.
120. IL
121. 553 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1990).
122. Id. at 988-89.
123. Id. at 991.
124. See Foster v. Loft, 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310-13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
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tender's criminal background, made no attempt to conduct a more thor-
ough investigation of his work experience and character references.'
1
Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals held a convenience store liable un-
der the doctrine of negligent supervision when a security guard, who had
a lengthy criminal record prior to his employment at the store, shot a cus-
tomer." These cases raise monitoring concerns for employers who are
unaware of their employees' past, or present, criminal conduct.
Notwithstanding the criminal history of a prospective employee,
courts are still willing to hold an employer liable if that employer has con-
structive knowledge of an employee's violent proclivities. For instance,
the owner of an apartment complex may be held liable for a property
manager's improprieties provided that there is sufficient evidence of both
general and specific behavior to create a jury issue as to at least construc-
tive knowledge.'2' In Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc.,2 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that evidence of an employee's alcoholism
and tendency toward violent behavior-in conjunction with the em-
ployer's knowledge of these predilections-presented a sufficient basis
for a jury determination on the employee's negligent retention claim.29
Employers who take subsequent action against an employee who
demonstrates violent propensities must exercise caution if that employee
has a recognized disability. Under both the ADA and the 1973 Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act ("Rehabilitation Act"), an employer is prohib-
125. Id. at 1312.
126. See Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Tex. App. 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (On an employment application, employee answered "yes" to a question report-
ing prior arrests but answered "no" to the next question concerning the type and disposition
of arrest.). For further discussion of the foreseeability of violent acts, see Porter v. Nemir,
900 S.W.2d 376, 386 (Tex. App. 1995, no writ). In this case, a Texas Court of Appeals held
an outpatient clinic liable for a sexual assault even though the assault occurred off premises,
while the perpetrator was off duty, and several months after the plaintiff had left the treat-
ment program at the clinic. The court reasoned that the employer was under a duty to insure
that its employees were competent. Id. at 385. Therefore, the plaintiff's injury was foresee-
able because the clinic neglected to properly investigate the employee's prior convictions of
sexual misconduct. Id
127. See Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc. v. Stanley, 378 S.E.2d 857,858 (Ga. 1989) (it was
common knowledge among both tenants and employees that the manager and her husband,
were drug users and were sexually promiscuous).
128. 688 P.2d 333 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
129. Id. at 341. In Pittard, an intoxicated hotel steward encountered a young boy near
the hotel's swimming pool. Id at 336. Shortly thereafter, he enticed the boy into a hotel
bathroom, where he "locked the door behind them, and sexually assaulted the boy." Id. The
court concluded that the evidence of prior violent alcohol-related incidents introduced at the
summary judgment hearing was sufficient enough to allow the plaintiffs to reach the jury. Id.
at 341.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ited from discriminating against a "qualified" employee on the basis of
that individual's disability.m In Franklin v. United States Postal Service,'3'
the district court found that a paranoid schizophrenic may be classified as
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. 132 In Franklin, the court held that
despite the fact that the employee "engaged in antisocial activities that
culminated in violence" on at least three prior occasions, the employee
was handicapped because her schizophrenia prohibited her from per-
forming the major life activity of work.133 The message from this case is
that employers must be cognizant of possible ADA claims when they
elect to take disciplinary action against a violent employee who is men-
tally handicapped. To add to the complexity, the courts are split on
whether the use of after-acquired evidence, such as false information
stated on an employment application, can give rise to a complete bar of
recovery once the employee has initiated an ADA claim. 4 As is clear in
the next section, employers are faced with a plethora of legal concerns in
attempting to avoid liability under claims for negligent retention and su-
pervision.
2. Difficulties Associated with the Application of Violence Prevention
Programs Used to Avoid Liability Under Theories of Negligent
Retention and Supervision
In response to the growing epidemic of workplace violence, employ-
ers have engaged in the practice of monitoring employee conduct as a
means of enforcing "zero tolerance policies" for violence in the work-
place.'35 However, an employer that uses intrusive monitoring may in-
vade the personal privacy of employees, which may in turn reduce pro-
ductivity and employee morale. 6 Nevertheless, concerns of productivity
and morale are just the "tip of the iceberg" when an employer elects to
130. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 202-03 (quotations omitted). A "qualified" em-
ployee is one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position." Id at 205-06 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
The 1973 Vocational Rehabilitation Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1994).
131. 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
132. See id. at 1218; Goldberg, supra note 5, at 204.
133. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 204 (footnote omitted); see also Hurley-Bardige v.
Brown, 900 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mass. 1995) (suit for rehabilitation discrimination). But see
Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 905 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. 111. 1995), affid, 117 F.3d 351
(7th Cir. 1997) (ADA suit for paranoia and depression).
134. See, e.g., Stradley v. LaFourche Communications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 442, 444-45
(E.D. La. 1994).
135. See Verkerke, supra note 34, at 359-60.
136. Id at 360-61.
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undertake violence prevention directives. Under these directives, an em-
ployer must often turn to someone capable of making a forensic assess-
ment of an individual's potential for violence.37 During the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association on August 4, 1996, one panel
member suggested that a company-sponsored assistance program for em-
ployees "might be adequate for dealing with alcoholism, but would be in-
capable of handling a fitness-for-duty assessment of someone who may be
violent."'3 At the same event, a practitioner urged interviewers to ask
broad questions designed to encourage an employee to speak at great
length, thus allowing for a better opportunity to assess demeanor.'39
However, this suggestion seems rather tenuous, because it is hard to
imagine that anyone would speak at great length during an interview
about his or her criminal record, or proclivity towards violence.
Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act also mitigate against
an employer's ability to implement strict violence prevention policies.
Recent decisions, such as the one reached in Collins v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield,'4 exemplify the difficulty facing employers under the current re-
gime. In Collins, a depressed employee threatened to kill her supervisor,
stating "I hate the bitch. She is living on borrowed time and she doesn't
know it. I have killed her a thousand times in my mind."'14 In response,
the employer took immediate action and terminated the employee.' 42 As
a result, the employee commenced an action for discrimination under the
ADA.'43 The court found for the employee and ordered her reinstate-
ment after determining that the plaintiff's depression was the root of her
violent behavior.' 44 In accordance with this decision, a federal district
court judge recently rejected an employer's defense that an employee
who brought a loaded gun to work posed a "direct threat" within the
137. See Workplace Violence: Legal Pitfalls of Forestalling Violence Probed by Ameri-
can Bar Association Panel, Empl. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at D-4 (Aug. 6,1996).
138. See id. (quoting Mr. Kenneth Wolf of Multi Resource Centers).
139. See id. (quoting Ms. Sandra McCandless).
140. 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995), vacated on procedural grounds, 103 F.3d 35
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the em-
ployee's complaint, which referred only to state law, to confirm the arbitration award against
the employer despite the fact that one of the primary issues set forth in the arbitration was
the employer's alleged violation of the ADA).
141. Id. at 640.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 643. "[L]iability hinged upon psychiatric opinion testimony, and plaintiff's
experts characterized her statements ... as mere 'expressions of her thought[s] ... consistent
with plaintiff's psychiatric diagnosis."' Id. See also Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 22.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
meaning of the ADA. 4 As the above cases illustrate, the protections af-
forded employees under federal statutes leave employers with questions
as to how to balance their liability between current anti-discrimination
and privacy laws and potentially violent episodes in the workplace.
Collective bargaining agreements may place an additional burden on
management to substantiate claims of violent conduct.'1 Unsubstantiated
allegations run the risk of claims for conspiracy, interference with con-
tractual relations, defamation, and invasion of privacy.' 14 In Columbia
Aluminum Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 8147,'1 the employer
brought an action to vacate an arbitration award that an employee who
was discharged for fighting.149 In response, the union counterclaimed
against the employer to enforce the award." Despite the fact that the
company had a strict policy against fighting, the district court upheld the
arbitrator's determination that the employee's actions were reasonable
under the circumstances because the employee "implicitly inferr[ed] that
such conduct [would] not repeat itself.""' Surprisingly, the court also up-
held the arbitrator's decision to award back pay to the employee, even
though the union's grievance only called for reinstatement.5 It is unclear
whether this type of decision would serve as a basis for relief from liability
if the same employee decided to engage in additional violent behavior
and an action was brought against the employer for injuries.
At certain times, the scope of an employer's liability for violent con-
duct may continue beyond the employment relationship. For the most
part, former employers are not obligated to disclose information about a
former employee to prospective employers "unless there is a special rela-
tionship between the parties or a violent episode is clearly foreseeable."' 53
145. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 22 (citing Hindeman v. GTE Data Serv.,
Inc., 3 ADA Cas. (BNA) 641 (M.D. Fla. 1994). But see Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F.
Supp. 1437 (D. Kan 1996) (refusing to extend the protection of the ADA to a threatening
employee who was perceived to be unstable); Moodie v. FRB, 862 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff'd, 58 F.3d 879 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discrimination suit brought after discharge for al-
tercation).
146. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 22.
147. See it
148. 922 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
149. Id. at 415.
150. Id
151. Id. at 420. See also UAW Local 771 v. Micro Mfg., 895 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mich.
1995); In re City of Massilon, Ohio, 92 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1303 (May 6, 1989) (Elkin,
Arb.).
152. See Columbia Aluminum Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local 8147, 922 F. Supp.
412,421 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
153. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 222 (emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, the term "special relationship" offers little guidance for em-
ployers in deciding the appropriate level of disclosure with respect to a
former employee. In Jemer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,m an action was
brought against Allstate Insurance in connection with the 1993 shooting
deaths of three office workers and the wounding of two others. The vic-
tims were shot by a man whom Allstate company previously had fired for
bringing a pistol to work.55 Because Allstate feared for the safety of its
own employees, the company provided the man's subsequent employer
with a favorable recommendation on the assailant's behalf. Was this de-
cision worth the risk? The fear of subsequent harm to employees can of-
ten lead to employment decisions that result in liability on other
grounds.' 56 Since the court system offers an employer little recourse
against former employees who engage in violent behavior,' an employer
must choose between the lesser of two evils when assessing preventive
strategies to curb workplace violence.
C. Voluntary Assumption of a Duty to Protect
Under the theory of voluntary assumption, a duty of care exists if a
party voluntarily or contractually assumes a duty to protect another from
the harmful acts of a third party.'- According to Section 324 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the third person for physical harm resulting from his fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a)
154. See Workplace Violence: Judge Allows Plaintiffs to Seek Damages over Recommen-
dation of Violent Employee, Daily Lab. Rep. News (BNA) at D-7 (Aug. 18,1995).
155. See Workplace Violence: Allstate Insurance Settles Lawsuit Connected to 1993
Shooting Deaths, EmpI. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at D-2 (Oct. 6, 1995); see also Randi W. v.
Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997) (holding that the author of a rec-
ommendation letter owes to prospective employers and third parties a duty to not misrepre-
sent the qualifications and character of a former employee, if the act of making such repre-
sentations would create a substantial foreseeable risk of physical harm to third parties).
156. See generally Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995)(plaintiff sued for
emotional distress after employer discharged her out of fear that her violent husband would
return to the office).
157. See, e.g., White v. Ransmeier & Spellman, 12 IER cases 376,377-78 (D.N.H. 1996)
(law firm had no claim for interference with contractual relations against legal secretary who
made threatening phone calls and death threats to certain firm employees).
158. See Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Employer's Liability to Employee or Agent for
Injury or Death Resulting from Assault or Criminal Attack by Third Person, 40 A.L.R. 5th 1,
32-35 (1996).
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his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking 59
In the employment context, "an employer's duty to protect employees
from the criminal acts of third parties arises from the employer's express
or implied promise to provide security. '
1. Duty of Protection Against Violent Persons Owed to Employees
Arising from Express or Implied Security Measures
As the following cases illustrate, a voluntary assumption of a duty to
protect exists once an employer contracts to provide security or actually
implements security measures. 6' In Slager v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 62 for example, a wrongful death action was brought against Com-
monwealth Edison after an employee was killed at the company's work
site during a wildcat strike. When the employee attempted to leave the
premises at the end of the workday, his car was struck by a picket sign."
In a panic, the worker accelerated into the path of an oncoming truck and
was killed instantly.66 The court held that the duty to the decedent arose
from the defendant's express statements, actions, and intent to provide
for the safety of the workers during the wildcat strike. 66 In Vaughn v.
Granite City Steel Division National Steel Corp.,167 the decedent was shot
in the defendant's parking lot just prior to reporting for work.'6T Al-
though there had been incidents of property damage in the lot, no other
acts of personal violence had been reported.'69 Nonetheless, the Illinois
Court of Appeals held that the employer was liable for negligently per-
forming its duty to protect its employees because expert testimony at the
trial established that the security in the parking lot was grossly inade-
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 324A (1965).
160. Phillips, supra note 1, at 160.
161. Id. at 161.
162. 595 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
163. IL at 1098.
164. Id. at 1100.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1104; but see York v. Modine Mfg. Co., 442 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982)(dismissing complaint because there were no facts to support plaintiff's allegations that
employer hired a security service for protection purposes).
167. 576 N.E.2d 874 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
168. Id. at 876-77.
169. Id at 877.
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quate.'7 Thus, employers who elect to implement security measures at
their facilities must also ensure that these measures are adequate to pre-
vent criminal attacks upon their employees.
In addition, the foreseeability factor plays a major role in the outcome
of voluntary assumption actions and is often determined by the number
of "prior similar incidents." In Mundy v. Department of Health & Human
Resources,171 a nurse was stabbed by an unknown assailant in the elevator
of the hospital where she worked.72 The court opined that the hospital's
security measures were reasonable under the circumstances since evi-
dence of a single criminal incident was insufficient to conclude that the
security was inadequate. ' Apparently, a "prior similar incident" involv-
ing another unknown assailant may have been necessary to show that the
hospital was on notice of the security situation. Unfortunately, the courts
have offered little guidance in their assessment of whether prior incidents
of violence rise to the level of foreseeability. Since the foreseeability test
is reserved for a jury under most circumstances, the unpredictable nature
of voluntary assumption claims pose an interesting dilemma for an em-
ployer interested in disseminating security and workplace safety proce-
dures.
2. Difficulties Employers Experience with the Voluntary Assumption
Theory
An examination of the case law undoubtedly brings the nebulous
character of the voluntary assumption theory to light. Employers often
experience difficulty in predicting when the exercise of control over the
work premises is sufficient to impose a duty to provide protection from
the criminal acts of third parties. As one commentator suggests:
"[b]ecause it is unclear when a voluntary assumption begins, fear of li-
ability could deter an employer from implementing any security measures
170. IU. at 883; but see McBeth v. TNS Mills, Inc., 458 S.E.2d 52,56 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(jury verdict for defendant affirmed after decedent employee was stabbed in the employer's
parking lot).
171. 620 So. 2d 811 (La. 1993).
172. Id. at 812.
173. Id. at 814. See also Rowe v. Schumpert Med. Ctr., 647 So. 2d 390, 395-96 (La. Ct.
App. 1994). Although the court agreed that the defendant had assumed a duty to protect
against criminal conduct, no breach of duty occurred because the incident was a random, un-
foreseeable act of violence. Id But see Martin v. McDonald's Corp., 572 N.E.2d 1073, 1078
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the corporation did not perform its duty of care when the
regional security manager failed to ensure the restaurant's proper implementation of security
procedures).
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at all."'74 Hence, the incentive to install security measures to protect
business property is minimized when these measures expose employers to
potential civil liability for injuries to employees.' As in claims for subse-
quent remedial measures, this type of situation is socially undesirable.
After all, if employers are deterred from acting to ensure the safety of
their premises in the first instance, neither employers nor employees will
benefit.
IV. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT ("OSHA") AND
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
A. The General Duty Clause
In 1970, Congress enacted the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 ("OSHA"), which mandates that each employer "furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to his employees. 1 76 The requirement to pro-
vide a safe workplace is commonly referred to as the "general duty
clause."'" OSHA administrators rely upon the General Duty Clause to
"cit[e] and prosecut[e] employers where 'there is a recognized hazard of
workplace violence ... and [employers] do nothing to abate it.""' ..8
Under Section 6 of OSHA, the Secretary of Labor has the burden of
proof in establishing a violation of the general duty clause.'79 In order to
prove that a general duty violation exists, the Secretary of Labor must es-
tablish: (1) that the existence of a hazard; (2) that the employer or the rest
of the industry recognized this hazard; (3) that the hazard was likely to
cause death or serious physical harm; and (4) that a feasible abatement
method existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard."
B. The 1996 OSHA Guidelines for Workplace Violence
In 1996, OSHA promulgated its Guidelines for Preventing Workplace
Violence for Health Care and Social Service Workers and drafted the
174. Phillips, supra note 1, at 165.
175. Id
176. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
(1994)).
177. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 144.
178. Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 20.
179. See Boone, supra note 32, at 875.
180. Id.
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Guidelines for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for Night Retail
Establishments.' Although the guidelines are tailored towards the health
care, social service, and retail industries, at least one commentator has
suggested that they are "generic in nature and OSHA will likely contend
that the general principles expressed are applicable to all industries.""
According to the guidelines, there are four general components to any ef-
fective safety and health program: (1) management commitment and em-
ployee involvement; (2) work site analysis; (3) hazard prevention and
control; and (4) safety and health training.' In addition, the new OSHA
guidelines require that management:
(1) allocate sufficient resources (monetary and otherwise) to the
violence prevention program; (2) develop a system of account-
ability for the program's implementation; (3) provide medical
and psychological counseling for employees exposed to violent
incidents; (4) create and disseminate a zero-tolerance policy for
workplace violence; (5) engage in detailed studies of the work-
site for trends and appropriate security measures; (6) create
physical and psychological barriers between employees and po-
tential perpetrators; and (7) implement comprehensive work-
place violence training and educational programs for supervisors
and employees alike.'g
Violations of these guidelines could carry substantial civil penalties
and even criminal prosecution in "egregious" cases.8 However, OSHA
states that it will not prosecute employers that implement the guide-
lines.'86 Nevertheless, OSHA has not stated to what extent each standard
must be present for them to be considered "implemented." The next sec-
tion discusses the uncertain future of these guidelines as a viable solution
to the current increase in workplace violence.
C. Feasibility of OSHA Guidelines with Respect to Enforcement and the
Admissibility of OSHA Standards in Private Causes of Action
As one commentator has observed, "[ilt is firmly established that a
private cause of action may not be based solely on OSHA.' ' .. However,
181. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 21.
182. Id.
183. I (quotations omitted).
184. Id.
185. 1&
186. Id
187. Phillips, supra note 1, at 180 (quoting MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH LAW § 141 (3d ed. 1990)).
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if a statutory duty arises under OSHA, the court would subsequently have
to determine whether non-compliance with OSHA standards is indicative
of negligence per se.' There is a sharp division among the courts con-
cerning the admissibility of OSHA standards as evidence of negligence. 9
Some courts have held that a violation of OSHA regulations constitutes
negligence per se, while others have held that violations may be used as
evidence of negligence but not of negligence per se. "° The admissibility of
OSHA standards for the defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk also lacks uniformity throughout the individual states.' Until
these issues are definitively settled, it is difficult to gauge the impact that
the new 1996 OSHA guidelines will have in private causes of action in the
context of workplace violence. This places a tremendous burden on em-
ployers who may have taken all of the necessary steps to comply with
OSHA standards, yet still remain liable under a litigated claim for work-
place violence.
Even OSHA itself is uncomfortable with its role in the enforcement
of workplace violence directives. In Secretary of Labor v. Megawest Fi-
nancial, Inc.,'92 an administrative law judge ("AL") vacated a citation
imposed upon a property management firm charged with failing to take
security measures to prevent assault and battery by irate tenants." In
discussing OSHA's attempts to reduce workplace violence, ALJ Nancy
Spies stated:
In the debate surrounding OSHA's function in reducing violence
in the workplace, certain facts must be accepted. First, nowhere
in the legislative history pertaining to the Act or in the scope of
the then-existing standards was there any implication that
OSHA should police social behavior. Second, a potential for
violence against employees working in the service sector exists
for an extremely broad spectrum of employers. Undeniably, en-
forcement in this arena could place extraordinary burdens on an
employer requiring it to anticipate the possibility of civic disor-
der. Third, enforcement in a sphere so distinct from that cov-
ered by OSHA's regulations would most surely tax OSHA's
limited resources in ways difficult to control.94
188. Phillips, supra note 1, at 180.
189. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 21.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1337 (1995).
193. Id. at 1337-41.
194. Id. at 1338.
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Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that OSHA is not
equipped to deal with the current workplace violence epidemic. The
agency is plagued with limited resources and is already confronted with a
broad range of complex safety issues that require funding. While
OSHA's current measures are very encouraging, they are narrowly tai-
lored and do not address the concerns of large-scale corporations, which,
because of the diverse nature of their business, cannot be held account-
able to the same standards as retail stores.'95 Moreover, the allocation of
"sufficient resources" and a "system of accountability," as the 1996 stan-
dards require, will be different depending upon the organization and its
level of profitability. Even if the current measures were able to address
these concerns, they fall short of addressing all of the various privacy and
discrimination concerns involved in disseminating a "zero-tolerance"
policy for workplace violence. Simply put, the General Duty Clause and
the 1996 OSHA guidelines do not offer a viable solution to the current
workplace violence dilemma. As the following discussion demonstrates,
comprehensive federal legislation will exert more influence in establishing
a legal duty for employers to prevent violent incidents in the workplace.
V. THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LEGISLATION
J. Donald Millar, who retired in August 1993 as the director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, sharply criticized
both the Clinton Administration and Capitol Hill at a conference for the
"widespread disinterest" they have demonstrated in preventing work-
place fatalities." Furthermore, Millar suggested that Congress approve
either separate legislation or an amendment to the health care reform
package that would require the federal government to "invest" in pre-
venting workplace injuries."
195. Even though the 1996 OSHA standards are geared toward the health and retail
industries, a current SHRM survey found that at large facilities (employing more than 251
workers) the fear of workplace violence was most prevalent. See Workplace Violence: Work-
place Violence Threats Common, SHRM Survey Finds, Empl. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at
D-5 (June 26, 1996). In comparison, only 36% of employees at smaller establishments
(employing less than 250 workers) said that they had experienced similar anxiety. See id.
196. Health Care: Administration, Hill Leaders Chastised for Excluding Job Safety From
Reform, Empl. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at D-6 (Jan. 18, 1994). The conference was or-
ganized by the Maryland-based non-profit Ramazzini Institute for Occupational and Envi-
ronmental Health Research to examine workplace violence and other selected topics. See id,
Millar also described the number of congressional members who are strong and consistent
advocates of workplace health as "pitifully small on both sides of the aisle." Id.
197. See id
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Establishing a duty under federal statute to address the specific issue
of workplace violence is the most tenable solution to the enigma sur-
rounding this area of the law. Because it possesses vast resources and
funding, Congress is better equipped than the courts, OSHA, or even the
state legislatures, to draft a comprehensive scheme for employers with re-
spect to workplace violence. While the current OSHA guidelines serve as
an appropriate benchmark, they are the extent of OSHA's ability to en-
sure that employers provide a safe working environment for employees.
Indeed, agency officials themselves have already acknowledged their in-
ability to respond to workplace violence issues given the current limita-
tions of staff and budget resources.98 By the same token, "the effective-
ness of citing an employer under the general duty clause to ensure worker
safety is minimal." '
A comprehensive statute or regulation requiring employers to insti-
tute certain security measures to specifically prevent criminal attacks on
employees could also benefit injured workers who seek relief within the
judicial system. Under a comprehensive legislation scheme, an injured
employee could escape the narrow confines of the exclusivity rule as long
as an employer's failure to conform to the workplace violence legislation
is deemed tantamount to an intentional tort.' At the same time, the
courts would have less difficulty in finding that a legal duty to third party
plaintiffs exists if it is based on a federal statute, ordinance, or regulation.
Working from the current case law and extensive research, the central
focus of the statute, ordinance, or regulation should be tailored to address
the following themes: (1) the work site location, (2) the background of
new employees, and (3) the employer's knowledge of changing circum-
stances. With respect to location, the legislation may require an employer
to consider whether each facility is located in a high crime area. Such
considerations would be based upon justice reports, information from lo-
cal police departments, etc. Under the employee background theme, the
legislation should provide some guidance as to what constitutes a suffi-
cient background check and it should attempt to reconcile this standard
with current EEOC restrictions. Finally, the knowledge theme should fo-
cus on potentially dangerous employee conflict?' and circumstances'
198. See id.
199. ld
200. Phillips, supra note 1, at 145.. The ramifications of non-compliance could be writ-
ten into the comments accompanying this legislation in order to support a cause of action un-
der intentional tort theories.
201. Such employee conflicts include domestic disputes, divorces, severe depression,
bankruptcy, etc.
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that could endanger other workers or third parties. Once a comprehen-
sive legislation scheme is promulgated, employers will be able to analyze
each of their work locations to determine what factors related to that lo-
cation could conceivably contribute to workplace violence.
By utilizing the legislative process, a statutory duty devised to address
business-related violence would truly reflect the expectations of society
and would serve as the uniform standard for employers in preventing
workplace violence.m
VI. CONCLUSION
The subject of workplace violence is one that "has no clear black-and-
white answers, but rather is a landscape painted in greys. '"" While it is
crucial for employers to understand the gravity of the problem, employee
protections afforded under current legislative schemes such as Title VII
and the ADA make it difficult for employers to take proactive steps to
ensure the safety of their employees and others. Despite the exclusive
remedy under workers' compensation law, the employer, in the absence
of preventive measures "under this tangled body of evolving law," is often
left exposed to liability for common law intentional tort claims. 5 In addi-
tion, neither the general duty clause nor the 1996 workplace violence
guidelines promulgated by OSHA are sufficient to address the current
workplace violence epidemic. Rather, Congress is the most appropriate
body to draft a legislative scheme capable of defining the duty of care
owed by employers to its employees and third persons in preventing
workplace violence.
Comprehensive federal legislation in this area will benefit both em-
ployers and victims of workplace violence by eliminating the unpredict-
able nature and controversial role of foreseeability used in determining
whether a legal duty exists. Such uniform standards will also assist large-
scale corporations that conduct business throughout the United States.
By extending a comprehensive statutory duty, Congress could provide a
202. Such circumstances include criminal convictions during the employment relation-
ship, drug or alcohol problems, outpatient psychiatric care, etc.
203. It should be noted that Congress recently received a request from the House Small
Business Committee for additional funds to support more specific studies on business related
crime and violence. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 149; House Small Business Committee Re-
quests Funds for More Research on Business Crime, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) at D-2 (Aug. 17,
1994).
204. Workplace Violence: Legal Pitfalls of Forestalling Violence Probed by American
Bar Association Panel, Empl. Pol'y & Law Daily (BNA) at D-4 (Aug. 6, 1996).
205. Sampson & Topazian, supra note 7, at 23.
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measurable standard of care for employers in order to curb the ever in-
creasing level of violent incidents in the workplace.
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